url_jail

https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/
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url_jail provides SSRF-safe URL validation for Rust and Python, validating URLs and resolved IPs to...
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### Example: Building a Policy with Blocked CIDR

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Demonstrates how to use PolicyBuilder to create a custom policy that blocks a specific IP range. Requires importing PolicyBuilder and Policy.

```rust
use url_jail::{PolicyBuilder, Policy};

let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::AllowPrivate)
    .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")
    .build();
```

--------------------------------

### Example Usage of ValidateOptions

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.ValidateOptions.html

Demonstrates how to create and use `ValidateOptions` with the `validate_with_options` function to customize URL validation, setting a specific DNS timeout.

```rust
use url_jail::{validate_with_options, Policy, ValidateOptions};
use std::time::Duration;

let opts = ValidateOptions {
    dns_timeout: Duration::from_secs(5),
};
let result = validate_with_options("https://example.com/", Policy::PublicOnly, opts).await?;

```

--------------------------------

### Create New PolicyBuilder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Initializes a new PolicyBuilder with a specified base policy. This is the starting point for defining custom network policies.

```rust
pub fn new(base: Policy) -> Self
```

--------------------------------

### Getting the URL Path

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.SafeUrl.html

Retrieves the path component of the URL. Returns '/' if no path is specified.

```rust
pub fn path(&self) -> &str
```

--------------------------------

### Validate a URL with PublicOnly Policy

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/fn.validate.html

This example demonstrates how to use the `validate` function to check if a URL is safe to connect to when only public IP addresses are allowed. It requires importing the `validate` function and the `Policy` enum from the `url_jail` crate. The result, if successful, contains the host and IP address.

```rust
use url_jail::{validate, Policy};

let result = validate("https://example.com/api", Policy::PublicOnly).await?;
println!("Safe to connect to {} ({})", result.host, result.ip);
```

--------------------------------

### Synchronous URL Validation Example

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/fn.validate_sync.html

Demonstrates how to use the `validate_sync` function to validate a URL against a public-only policy. This function blocks the current thread during DNS resolution. It returns a Result containing either the validated URL information or an error.

```rust
use url_jail::{validate_sync, Policy};

let result = validate_sync("https://example.com/api", Policy::PublicOnly)?;
println!("Safe to connect to {} ({})", result.host, result.ip);
```

--------------------------------

### Get URL Path

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Retrieves the path component of the SafeUrl. Returns '/' if no path is specified.

```rust
pub fn path(&self) -> &str {
    self.inner.path()
}
```

--------------------------------

### Custom Policy with Block and Allow CIDRs

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Example of creating a custom policy using PolicyBuilder. It blocks a specific CIDR range but allows a sub-range within it, demonstrating precedence rules. The policy is immutable after building.

```rust
use url_jail::{PolicyBuilder, Policy};

let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::AllowPrivate)
    .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")
    .allow_cidr("10.1.0.0/16")  // This takes precedence
    .build();

// 10.1.x.x is allowed (matches allow rule)
assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.1.2.3".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
// 10.2.x.x is blocked (matches block rule, no allow rule)
assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.2.0.1".parse().unwrap()).is_err());

```

--------------------------------

### Match hostname against pattern with wildcard

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Checks if a given hostname matches a pattern that supports the '*' wildcard. Handles patterns starting with '*.' for subdomains.

```rust
fn matches_hostname_pattern(host: &str, pattern: &str) -> bool {
    if pattern.starts_with("*.") {
        let suffix = &pattern[1..]; // ".example.com"
        host.ends_with(suffix) || host == &pattern[2..]
    } else {
        host == pattern
    }
}
```

--------------------------------

### Test Block IPv6 Link-Local Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Verifies that IPv6 link-local addresses (starting with `fe80::`) are blocked.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_block_ipv6_link_local() {
        let result = validate("http://[fe80::1]/", Policy::PublicOnly).await;
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Getting the Full Normalized URL String

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.SafeUrl.html

Converts the SafeUrl back into its full normalized string representation, including scheme, host, port (if non-default), path, query, and fragment.

```rust
pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str
```

--------------------------------

### Parse URL with Hostname Starting with Hyphen

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Checks parsing of a URL with a hostname that starts with a hyphen. This is an invalid DNS name but might be accepted by URL parsers without panicking.

```rust
let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://-invalid.example.com/");
// Either accept or reject is fine, just don't panic
let _ = result;
```

--------------------------------

### Creating and Using a CustomPolicy

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.CustomPolicy.html

Demonstrates how to build a CustomPolicy with specific allow and block rules for IP addresses. Allow rules take precedence over block rules.

```rust
use url_jail::{PolicyBuilder, Policy};

let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::AllowPrivate)
    .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")
    .allow_cidr("10.1.0.0/16")  // This takes precedence
    .build();

// 10.1.x.x is allowed (matches allow rule)
assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.1.2.3".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
// 10.2.x.x is blocked (matches block rule, no allow rule)
assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.2.0.1".parse().unwrap()).is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Wildcard Hostname Matches Exact

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Confirms that a wildcard pattern like '*.example.com' also blocks the exact hostname 'example.com'.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_block_host_wildcard_matches_exact() {
        // *.example.com should also match example.com itself
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_host("*.example.com")
            .build();

        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("sub.example.com").is_err());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("example.com").is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Getting the Port Number

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.SafeUrl.html

Retrieves the port number from a SafeUrl. Defaults to 80 for http and 443 for https if not explicitly specified.

```rust
pub fn port(&self) -> u16
```

--------------------------------

### Handle DNS Rebinding Hostnames (nip.io style)

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Demonstrates parsing URLs with hostnames that resolve to IPs, like nip.io. Parsing succeeds, but DNS validation is required to catch these.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "127.0.0.1.nip.io");
```

--------------------------------

### PolicyBuilder::new

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Initializes a new PolicyBuilder with a specified base policy.

```APIDOC
## PolicyBuilder::new

### Description
Creates a new builder with the given base policy.

### Method

```rust
pub fn new(base: Policy) -> Self
```

### Parameters

* **base** (Policy) - The base policy to initialize the builder with.
```

--------------------------------

### Create a new PolicyBuilder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Initializes a new PolicyBuilder with a specified base policy. Uses Default::default() for other fields.

```rust
pub fn new(base: Policy) -> Self {
        Self {
            base,
            ..Default::default()
        }
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Get Port Number

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Retrieves the port number for a SafeUrl. It returns the explicitly specified port or defaults to 80 for http and 443 for https.

```rust
pub fn port(&self) -> u16 {
    self.inner.port_or_known_default().unwrap_or(80)
}
```

--------------------------------

### Handle DNS Rebinding Hostnames (xip.io style)

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Similar to nip.io, this snippet shows parsing URLs with xip.io style hostnames. Parsing should succeed, relying on subsequent DNS validation.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://192.168.1.1.xip.io/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "192.168.1.1.xip.io");
```

--------------------------------

### Getting the Normalized Hostname

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.SafeUrl.html

Retrieves the normalized hostname from a SafeUrl. The hostname is lowercased and has any trailing dot removed. For IPv6 addresses, brackets are included.

```rust
pub fn host(&self) -> &str
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Wildcard Hostname

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Shows how to allow hostnames matching a wildcard pattern, while still blocking others.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_allow_host_wildcard() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_host("*.example.com")
            .allow_host("*.trusted.example.com")
            .build();

        assert!(policy
            .is_hostname_allowed("api.trusted.example.com")
            .is_ok());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("other.example.com").is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Parse URLs with Hostnames Containing Numbers

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that URLs with hostnames that include numbers, including those starting with numbers or having numbers in the TLD, are parsed correctly.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://host123.example.com/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "host123.example.com");
```

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://123host.example.com/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "123host.example.com");
```

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://example.co2/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "example.co2");
```

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://0177.example.com/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "0177.example.com");
```

--------------------------------

### Test Wildcard Matches Base Hostname

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Verifies that a wildcard pattern like '*.example.com' also matches the base domain 'example.com'.

```rust
#[test]
    fn test_matches_hostname_pattern_wildcard_matches_base() {
        // *.example.com should also match example.com
        assert!(matches_hostname_pattern("example.com", "*.example.com"));
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Parse URL with Fragment and Access Host

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Demonstrates parsing a URL that includes a fragment identifier and verifying its host.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("https://example.com/path#fragment").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "example.com");
```

--------------------------------

### Custom URL Validation with PolicyBuilder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/fn.validate_custom.html

Demonstrates how to create a custom policy that blocks a specific CIDR range and then use it to validate a URL. Requires importing `validate_custom`, `PolicyBuilder`, and `Policy` from the url_jail crate.

```rust
use url_jail::{validate_custom, PolicyBuilder, Policy};

let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::AllowPrivate)
    .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")
    .build();

let result = validate_custom("https://example.com/", &policy).await?;
```

--------------------------------

### Block Hostname Pattern

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Demonstrates blocking hostnames that match a wildcard pattern, ensuring subdomains are also blocked.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_block_host_pattern() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_host("*.internal.example.com")
            .build();

        assert!(policy
            .is_hostname_allowed("api.internal.example.com")
            .is_err());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("api.example.com").is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Verify DNS Resolution Path

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Checks that the DNS resolution and verification code path is executed for a valid domain like example.com. This test implicitly relies on other tests for actual multi-IP blocking logic.

```Rust
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_multi_ip_all_checked() {
    // We can't easily control DNS results, but we can verify the code path
    // by checking that resolve_and_verify_dns exists and is used
    // The actual multi-IP check is implicitly tested by the blocklist tests
    let result = validate("https://example.com/", Policy::PublicOnly).await;
    assert!(result.is_ok());
}
```

--------------------------------

### Block Multiple Hostnames

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Shows how to apply multiple distinct hostname block rules to a policy.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_block_multiple_hosts() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_host("*.internal.com")
            .block_host("*.private.org")
            .build();

        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("api.internal.com").is_err());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("db.private.org").is_err());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("public.example.com").is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Specific Hostname

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Demonstrates allowing a specific hostname, overriding any general blocking rules.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_allow_host_pattern() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .allow_host("trusted.internal")
            .build();

        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("trusted.internal").is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Policy Builder Chaining

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Demonstrates constructing a complex policy by chaining builder methods for blocking/allowing CIDRs and hostnames.

```rust
#[test]
    fn test_builder_chaining() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")
            .allow_cidr("10.1.0.0/16")
            .block_host("*.internal.com")
            .allow_host("trusted.internal.com")
            .build();

        // IP checks
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.1.2.3".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.2.0.1".parse().unwrap()).is_err());

        // Hostname checks
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("trusted.internal.com").is_ok());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("other.internal.com").is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### DANGEROUS: Allow Localhost Access

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Demonstrates a dangerous use of allow_* methods, which can override base policy blocks and defeat SSRF protection. Use with extreme caution and only for audited use cases.

```rust
use url_jail::{PolicyBuilder, Policy};

// DANGEROUS: This allows localhost access!
let bad_policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
    .allow_cidr("127.0.0.0/8")  // Defeats SSRF protection!
    .build();

```

--------------------------------

### Allow CIDR Precedence Over Block

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Illustrates that a more specific 'allow' rule takes precedence over a broader 'block' rule for IP addresses.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_allow_takes_precedence_over_block() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")
            .allow_cidr("10.1.0.0/16")
            .build();

        // 10.1.x.x is allowed despite 10.0.0.0/8 being blocked
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.1.2.3".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
        // Other 10.x.x.x still blocked
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.2.0.1".parse().unwrap()).is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Specific Private IP

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Demonstrates allowing a specific private IP address that would otherwise be blocked by a default policy.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_allow_private_ip() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .allow_cidr("192.168.1.50/32")
            .build();

        assert!(policy
            .is_ip_allowed("192.168.1.50".parse().unwrap())
            .is_ok());
        // Other private IPs still blocked by base policy
        assert!(policy
            .is_ip_allowed("192.168.2.1".parse().unwrap())
            .is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Customizing URL Validation Options

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Demonstrates how to set custom DNS resolution timeouts for URL validation using ValidateOptions.

```rust
use url_jail::{validate_with_options, Policy, ValidateOptions};
use std::time::Duration;

# async fn example() -> Result<(), url_jail::Error> {
let opts = ValidateOptions {
    dns_timeout: Duration::from_secs(5),
};
let result = validate_with_options("https://example.com/", Policy::PublicOnly, opts).await?;
# Ok(())
# }
```

--------------------------------

### Handle IPv6 with Zone ID

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Demonstrates parsing an IPv6 address that includes a zone ID (e.g., fe80::1%eth0). The URL crate might parse this, and the host should contain the zone ID. Rejection is also acceptable.

```rust
let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://[fe80::1%25eth0]/");
match result {
    Ok(url) => {
        assert!(url.host().contains("fe80"));
    }
    Err(_) => {} // Rejection is fine
}
```

--------------------------------

### Handle IPv6 with Embedded IPv4 Loopback

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Shows parsing of an IPv6 address in the format ::127.0.0.1. The parsed host should indicate the presence of 127.0.0.1 or ::.

```rust
let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://[::127.0.0.1]/");
match result {
    Ok(url) => {
        let host = url.host();
        assert!(host.contains("127.0.0.1") || host.contains("::"));
    }
    Err(_) => {} // Rejection is fine
}
```

--------------------------------

### Custom URL Policy Builder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/index.html

Demonstrates creating a custom URL validation policy using `PolicyBuilder`. Allows for fine-grained control by blocking and allowing specific CIDR ranges or hosts. Builds upon `Policy::AllowPrivate`.

```rust
use url_jail::{PolicyBuilder, Policy};

let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::AllowPrivate)
    .block_cidr("10.0.0.0/8")           // Block specific range
    .allow_cidr("10.1.0.0/16")          // But allow a subnet
    .block_host("*.internal.example.com")
    .build();
```

--------------------------------

### Generic Implementations for Validated

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.Validated.html

Shows various blanket implementations for traits like Any, Borrow, CloneToUninit, From, Instrument, Into, Pointable, ToOwned, TryFrom, TryInto, VZip, and WithSubscriber.

```rust
fn type_id(&self) -> TypeId
```

```rust
fn borrow(&self) -> &T
```

```rust
fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T
```

```rust
unsafe fn clone_to_uninit(&self, dest: *mut u8)
```

```rust
fn from(t: T) -> T
```

```rust
fn instrument(self, span: Span) -> Instrumented<Self>
```

```rust
fn in_current_span(self) -> Instrumented<Self>
```

```rust
fn into(self) -> U
```

```rust
const ALIGN: usize
```

```rust
type Init = T
```

```rust
unsafe fn init(init: <T as Pointable>::Init) -> usize
```

```rust
unsafe fn deref<'a>(ptr: usize) -> &'a T
```

```rust
unsafe fn deref_mut<'a>(ptr: usize) -> &'a mut T
```

```rust
unsafe fn drop(ptr: usize)
```

```rust
type Owned = T
```

```rust
fn to_owned(&self) -> T
```

```rust
fn clone_into(&self, target: &mut T)
```

```rust
type Error = Infallible
```

```rust
fn try_from(value: U) -> Result<T, <T as TryFrom<U>>::Error>
```

```rust
type Error = <U as TryFrom<T>>::Error
```

```rust
fn try_into(self) -> Result<U, <U as TryFrom<T>>::Error>
```

```rust
fn vzip(self) -> V
```

```rust
fn with_subscriber<S>(self, subscriber: S) -> WithDispatch<Self>
```

```rust
fn with_current_subscriber(self) -> WithDispatch<Self>
```

--------------------------------

### Parse URL with Empty Query and Access Host

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests parsing a URL with an empty query string and confirms the host is correctly extracted.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("https://example.com/path?").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "example.com");
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Standard IPv4 Address with Port

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that a URL with a standard IPv4 address and a custom port is parsed successfully.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://192.168.1.1:8080/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "192.168.1.1");
assert_eq!(url.port(), 8080);
```

--------------------------------

### Reject Userinfo with IP Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests the rejection of URLs containing userinfo (e.g., 'safe.com@') before an IP address, which is a security risk.

```rust
#[test]
fn test_redteam_at_symbol_userinfo_with_ip() {
    // Attempt: user thinks they're going to safe.com, but @ makes 127.0.0.1 the real host
    let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://safe.com@127.0.0.1/");
    // This MUST be rejected - we block userinfo
    assert!(result.is_err(), "Userinfo with @ must be rejected");
}
```

--------------------------------

### Allow IPv6 Address with Port

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that a URL with an IPv6 address and a custom port is parsed successfully.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://[::1]:8080/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "[::1]");
assert_eq!(url.port(), 8080);
```

--------------------------------

### Block Exact Hostname

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Shows how to block a specific hostname exactly, without affecting subdomains or other hostnames.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_block_host_exact() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_host("blocked.example.com")
            .build();

        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("blocked.example.com").is_err());
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("other.example.com").is_ok());
        // Subdomain should NOT match exact hostname block
        assert!(policy
            .is_hostname_allowed("sub.blocked.example.com")
            .is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Red Team Allow Private Blocks Link Local

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Verifies that the AllowPrivate policy still blocks link-local IP addresses.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_redteam_allow_private_blocks_link_local() {
        let result = validate("http://169.254.1.1/", Policy::AllowPrivate).await;
        assert!(result.is_err(), "AllowPrivate must still block link-local");
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Parse URL with Empty Fragment and Access Host

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Verifies that a URL with an empty fragment identifier is parsed correctly, and its host is accessible.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("https://example.com/path#").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "example.com");
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Hostname Precedence Over Block

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Illustrates that a specific 'allow' rule for a hostname takes precedence over a broader 'block' rule.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_allow_host_takes_precedence_over_block() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .block_host("*.example.com")
            .allow_host("trusted.example.com")
            .build();

        // trusted.example.com is allowed despite *.example.com being blocked
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("trusted.example.com").is_ok());
        // Other subdomains still blocked
        assert!(policy.is_hostname_allowed("blocked.example.com").is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Custom Validation with Options

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Tests the `validate_custom_with_options` function, demonstrating how to pass custom validation options like DNS timeouts.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_validate_custom_with_options() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly).build();
        let opts = ValidateOptions {
            dns_timeout: Duration::from_secs(10),
        };

        let result = validate_custom_with_options("https://example.com/", &policy, opts).await;
        assert!(result.is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test URL Parsing Without Scheme

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Validates that URLs lacking a scheme (e.g., 'example.com' or '//example.com') are rejected.

```rust
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("example.com").is_err());
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("//example.com").is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### PolicyBuilder::build

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Constructs and returns the final custom policy based on the builder's configuration.

```APIDOC
## PolicyBuilder::build

### Description
Builds the custom policy.

### Method

```rust
pub fn build(self) -> CustomPolicy
```

### Returns

* **CustomPolicy** - The constructed custom policy.
```

--------------------------------

### Handle IPv4-Mapped IPv6 for Metadata

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests parsing an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address, often used for metadata endpoints. Parsing should succeed, and IP validation should catch it.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/").unwrap();
assert!(url.host().contains("169.254") || url.host().contains("ffff"));
```

--------------------------------

### Fetch with Redirect Validation

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/index.html

Uses the `fetch` function from `url_jail` to validate each redirect in a chain. This provides the safest approach for handling redirects. Requires the `fetch` feature to be enabled.

```rust
use url_jail::{fetch, Policy};

let result = fetch("https://example.com/", Policy::PublicOnly).await?;
println!("Final response: {:?}", result.response.status());
println!("Redirect chain: {} hops", result.chain.len());
```

--------------------------------

### DNS Resolution and Policy Verification

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Resolves a hostname to an IP address with a timeout and verifies ALL resolved IPs against a given policy. Fails if any IP is blocked.

```rust
/// Resolve a hostname to IP addresses with timeout, checking ALL against policy.
/// Returns the first allowed IP, or an error if any IP is blocked.
async fn resolve_and_verify_dns(
    host: &str,
    timeout: Duration,
    policy: Policy,
) -> Result<IpAddr, Error> {
    let host_str = host.trim_start_matches('[').trim_end_matches(']');
    if let Ok(ip) = host_str.parse::<IpAddr>() {
        // Literal IP - check directly
        if let Some(reason) = is_ip_blocked(ip, policy) {
            return Err(Error::ssrf_blocked(host, ip, reason));
        }
        return Ok(ip);
    }

    let resolve_future = async {
        let resolver = TokioResolver::builder_tokio()
            .map_err(|e| Error::dns_error(host, e.to_string()))?;

        let response = resolver
            .lookup_ip(host)
            .await
            .map_err(|e| Error::dns_error(host, e.to_string()))?;

        let ips: Vec<IpAddr> = response.iter().collect();
        if ips.is_empty() {
            return Err(Error::dns_error(host, "no IP addresses found"));
        }

        // Check ALL resolved IPs - if ANY is blocked, fail
        // This prevents attackers from hiding a blocked IP among allowed ones
        for ip in &ips {
            if let Some(reason) = is_ip_blocked(*ip, policy) {
                return Err(Error::ssrf_blocked(host, *ip, reason));
            }
        }

        // All IPs are safe, return the first one
        Ok(ips[0])
    };

    tokio::time::timeout(timeout, resolve_future)
        .await
        .map_err(|_| Error::Timeout {
            message: format!("DNS resolution for {} timed out after {:?}", host, timeout),
        })?;
}
```

--------------------------------

### Block Hostname or Pattern with PolicyBuilder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Adds a rule to block a specific hostname or a pattern. Wildcards like '*.internal.example.com' are supported. This method can be chained.

```rust
pub fn block_host(self, pattern: &str) -> Self
```

--------------------------------

### Reject Userinfo with Metadata IP

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests the rejection of URLs attempting to access metadata services (e.g., 169.254.169.254) via userinfo confusion.

```rust
#[test]
fn test_redteam_at_symbol_userinfo_with_metadata() {
    // Attempt to access metadata via userinfo confusion
    let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://google.com@169.254.169.254/");
    assert!(result.is_err(), "Userinfo must be rejected");
}
```

--------------------------------

### Test Hostname Blocklist

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/blocklist.rs.html

Verifies that known internal hostnames are blocked, while external hostnames are not.

```Rust
assert!(is_hostname_blocked("metadata.google.internal").is_some());
        assert!(is_hostname_blocked("METADATA.GOOGLE.INTERNAL").is_some());
        assert!(is_hostname_blocked("metadata.azure.internal").is_some());
        assert!(is_hostname_blocked("example.com").is_none());
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Loopback IP Override

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Shows how to override the default blocking of loopback addresses by explicitly allowing a CIDR range.

```Rust
    #[test]
    fn test_allow_loopback_override() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::PublicOnly)
            .allow_cidr("127.0.0.0/8")
            .build();

        // Loopback is normally always blocked, but we explicitly allowed it
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("127.0.0.1".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("127.1.2.3".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Parse and Access URL Host

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Demonstrates parsing a URL string into a SafeUrl and accessing its host component. Ensures the URL contains a specific domain.

```rust
let safe_url = SafeUrl::parse("http://example.com/").unwrap();
let inner_url = safe_url.into_url();
assert_eq!(inner_url.host_str(), Some("example.com"));
```

--------------------------------

### Block Metadata Server Access with Path

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Tests the blocking of access attempts to specific paths on the instance metadata server.

```Rust
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_redteam_ssrf_metadata_with_path() {
    let result = validate(
        "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/",
        Policy::PublicOnly,
    )
    .await;
    assert!(result.is_err());
}
```

--------------------------------

### Parse URL with Query and Fragment

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Parses a URL that includes query parameters and a fragment identifier. Verifies host and path extraction.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("https://example.com/path?query=1#fragment").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "example.com");
assert_eq!(url.path(), "/path");
```

--------------------------------

### Test Full-Width IP Address Normalization

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests how the parser handles full-width numerals in an IP address. The URL crate's normalization to ASCII should be caught by the IP blocklist.

```rust
fn test_redteam_full_width_ip() {
        // Full-width numerals: １２７ (U+FF11 U+FF12 U+FF17)
        // URL crate converts these to ASCII - this is GOOD because our IP blocklist catches it
        let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://\u{FF11}\u{FF12}\u{FF17}.0.0.1/");
        match result {
            Ok(url) => {
                // Normalized to 127.0.0.1, which our IP blocklist will catch
                // Either the URL crate normalizes it (127.0.0.1) or keeps it as-is
                // Either way, IP validation will handle it
                let _ = url.host();
            }
            Err(_) => {} // Rejection is also fine
        }
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Handle Port with Leading Zeros

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests parsing of URLs with ports that have leading zeros, ensuring they are correctly interpreted as decimal. Rejection is also acceptable.

```Rust
let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://example.com:0080/");
match result {
    Ok(url) => assert_eq!(url.port(), 80),
    Err(_) => {} // Rejection is also acceptable
}
```

--------------------------------

### Reject URLs with Userinfo

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that URLs containing user information (username and password) in the host are rejected.

```rust
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("http://admin:password@127.0.0.1/").is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Allow IPv6 Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that a URL with a standard IPv6 loopback address is parsed successfully.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://[::1]/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "[::1]");
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Full IPv6 Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that a URL with a full IPv6 address is parsed successfully.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://[2001:db8::1]/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "[2001:db8::1]");
```

--------------------------------

### Reject Userinfo with IP Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that URLs containing userinfo along with an IP address are rejected.

```rust
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("http://user:pass@127.0.0.1").is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Handle Scheme Without Slashes

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests parsing URLs where the scheme is not followed by double slashes (e.g., http:127.0.0.1/). The URL crate typically parses this as a path, not a host.

```rust
let result = SafeUrl::parse("http:127.0.0.1/");
match result {
    Ok(url) => {
        let _host = url.host();
    }
    Err(_) => {} // Rejection is fine
}
```

--------------------------------

### Test AllowPrivate Policy: Still Blocks Loopback

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Confirms that even with the `AllowPrivate` policy, loopback addresses (127.0.0.1) are still blocked for security.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_allow_private_still_blocks_loopback() {
        let result = validate("http://127.0.0.1/", Policy::AllowPrivate).await;
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test IPv4-Compatible IPv6 Metadata Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/blocklist.rs.html

Verifies that the metadata address represented in IPv4-compatible IPv6 format (::169.254.169.254) is blocked. This ensures that metadata services are not accessible via this format.

```Rust
fn test_ipv4_compatible_ipv6_metadata() {
    // ::169.254.169.254 - metadata via IPv4-compatible
    let compat: IpAddr = "::169.254.169.254".parse().unwrap();
    assert!(is_ip_blocked(compat, Policy::PublicOnly).is_some());
}
```

--------------------------------

### SafeUrl::as_str

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.SafeUrl.html

Returns the full normalized URL as a string, including scheme, host, port (if non-default), path, query, and fragment.

```APIDOC
## SafeUrl::as_str

### Description
Gets the complete normalized URL as a string.

### Method
`pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str`

### Parameters
None

### Request Example
None

### Response
#### Success Response
- `&str`: The full normalized URL string.

### Response Example
None
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Standard IPv4 Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests that a URL with a standard IPv4 address as the host is parsed successfully.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://127.0.0.1/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "127.0.0.1");
```

--------------------------------

### Default PolicyBuilder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Provides a default PolicyBuilder instance. This is useful when a basic builder is needed without explicit initialization.

```rust
fn default() -> PolicyBuilder
```

--------------------------------

### Create DnsError Error

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/error.rs.html

Constructs an Error::DnsError variant. Use this when a DNS resolution fails.

```rust
pub(crate) fn dns_error(host: impl Into<String>, message: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self::DnsError {
            host: host.into(),
            message: message.into(),
        }
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Asynchronous Validation with Very Short DNS Timeout

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Tests the `validate_with_options` function with a very short DNS timeout to ensure it handles timeouts gracefully without panicking.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_validate_with_very_short_timeout() {
        let opts = ValidateOptions {
            dns_timeout: Duration::from_millis(1),
        };
        let result = validate_with_options("https://very-slow-dns-example.invalid/", Policy::PublicOnly, opts).await;
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Red Team Allow Private Allows Private

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Tests that the AllowPrivate policy permits access to private IP ranges, even if DNS resolution fails.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_redteam_allow_private_allows_private() {
        // Private IPs should work with AllowPrivate
        // These will fail DNS, but the IP wouldn't be blocked
        let result = validate("http://10.0.0.1/", Policy::AllowPrivate).await;
        // Should be SSRF blocked with PublicOnly, but not with AllowPrivate
        // Will actually fail with DNS error since 10.0.0.1 isn't resolvable
        match &result {
            Err(Error::SsrfBlocked { .. }) => {
                panic!("Private IP should not be SSRF blocked with AllowPrivate")
            }
            _ => {} // DNS error or success (if IP is parsed directly)
        }
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Block a hostname or pattern

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Adds a hostname or pattern to the blocklist. Supports wildcard characters like '*'. Patterns are converted to lowercase.

```rust
pub fn block_host(mut self, pattern: &str) -> Self {
        self.blocked_hosts.push(pattern.to_lowercase());
        self
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Red Team Allow Private Blocks Loopback

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Verifies that the AllowPrivate policy still blocks loopback addresses.

```rust
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn test_redteam_allow_private_blocks_loopback() {
        let result = validate("http://127.0.0.1/", Policy::AllowPrivate).await;
        assert!(result.is_err(), "AllowPrivate must still block loopback");
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Backslash as Path Separator in URL

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests if a URL with Windows-style path separators (\) is parsed correctly, ensuring the host remains as expected. The host should be correctly identified.

```rust
fn test_redteam_backslash_as_path_separator() {
        // Windows-style path separator
        let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://example.com\\path\\to\\file");
        match result {
            Ok(url) => {
                assert_eq!(url.host(), "example.com");
            }
            Err(_) => {} // Rejection is also acceptable
        }
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Blocked Subdomains

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/blocklist.rs.html

Verifies that subdomains of blocked hostnames are also blocked. This ensures that the blocklist applies recursively to nested hostnames.

```Rust
fn test_hostname_blocklist_subdomain() {
    // Subdomains of blocked hostnames should also be blocked
    assert!(is_hostname_blocked("sub.metadata.google.internal").is_some());
    assert!(is_hostname_blocked("deep.sub.metadata.google.internal").is_some());
}
```

--------------------------------

### Test File Scheme URL

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Validates that URLs using the 'file://' scheme are rejected when using PublicOnly policy.

```Rust
let result = validate("file:///etc/passwd", Policy::PublicOnly).await;
        assert!(result.is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Test Whitespace-Only URL Parsing

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Verifies that a URL consisting only of whitespace is correctly rejected.

```rust
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("   ").is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Handle Subdomain Resembling IP Address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests parsing a URL where a subdomain looks like an IP address. This is considered a valid hostname and requires DNS validation.

```rust
let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://127.0.0.1.attacker.com/").unwrap();
assert_eq!(url.host(), "127.0.0.1.attacker.com");
```

--------------------------------

### Test AllowPrivate Policy Allows Private IPs

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Confirms that a Policy set to AllowPrivate correctly permits private IP addresses.

```rust
#[test]
    fn test_allow_private_base_allows_private() {
        let policy = PolicyBuilder::new(Policy::AllowPrivate).build();

        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("192.168.1.1".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
        assert!(policy.is_ip_allowed("10.0.0.1".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test Hostname Pattern Matching Case Sensitivity

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Demonstrates that matches_hostname_pattern expects lowercase input and does not handle case mismatches; callers should lowercase hostnames.

```rust
#[test]
    fn test_matches_hostname_pattern_case() {
        // Function expects lowercase input
        assert!(matches_hostname_pattern("example.com", "example.com"));
        // Case mismatch - function doesn't handle, caller should lowercase
        assert!(!matches_hostname_pattern("EXAMPLE.COM", "example.com"));
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Reject Unbalanced Brackets

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests the rejection of URLs with unbalanced brackets around IPv6 addresses.

```rust
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("http://[::1/").is_err());
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("http://::1]/").is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Block Unspecified IP with AllowPrivate Policy

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Verifies that unspecified IP addresses are blocked even when the policy allows private IP addresses.

```Rust
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_block_unspecified_with_allow_private() {
    // Unspecified should be blocked even with AllowPrivate
    let result = validate("http://0.0.0.0/", Policy::AllowPrivate).await;
    assert!(result.is_err());
}
```

--------------------------------

### Synchronous Validation of Public IP

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/validate.rs.html

Tests the synchronous `validate_sync` function to confirm it correctly validates a public IP address and extracts host and port information.

```rust
    #[test]
    fn test_validate_sync_public_ip() {
        let result = validate_sync("https://example.com/", Policy::PublicOnly);
        assert!(result.is_ok());
        let validated = result.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(validated.host, "example.com");
        assert_eq!(validated.port, 443);
        assert!(validated.https);
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Test IPv6 Loopback Variations

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/blocklist.rs.html

Ensures that various representations of the IPv6 loopback address (::1) are correctly blocked. This includes full, abbreviated, and zero-padded forms.

```Rust
fn test_redteam_ipv6_loopback_variations() {
    // Various representations of ::1
    assert!(is_ip_blocked("::1".parse().unwrap(), Policy::PublicOnly).is_some());
    assert!(is_ip_blocked("0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1".parse().unwrap(), Policy::PublicOnly).is_some());
    assert!(is_ip_blocked(
        "0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0001".parse().unwrap(),
        Policy::PublicOnly
    )
    .is_some());
}
```

--------------------------------

### Test Empty URL Parsing

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Ensures that parsing an empty string as a URL results in an error.

```rust
assert!(SafeUrl::parse("").is_err());
```

--------------------------------

### Parse IPv6 loopback address

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests parsing of the IPv6 loopback address `[::1]`. The host is correctly identified.

```rust
fn test_ipv6_loopback() {
    let url = SafeUrl::parse("http://[::1]/").unwrap();
    assert_eq!(url.host(), "[::1]");
}
```

--------------------------------

### Error Handling for URL Validation

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/index.html

Shows how to handle errors returned by `validate_sync` using pattern matching on the `Error` enum. Differentiates between security rejections and temporary errors. Requires `validate_sync` and `Policy` from `url_jail`.

```rust
use url_jail::{validate_sync, Policy, Error};

match validate_sync("http://127.0.0.1/", Policy::PublicOnly) {
    Ok(v) => println!("Safe: {}", v.ip),
    Err(e) if e.is_blocked() => {
        // Security rejection: SsrfBlocked, HostnameBlocked, RedirectBlocked
        println!("Blocked: {}", e);
        if let Some(url) = e.url() {
            println!("URL: {}", url);
        }
    }
    Err(e) if e.is_retriable() => {
        // Temporary error: DnsError, Timeout, HttpError
        // Retry with caution for untrusted URLs
        println!("Temporary: {}", e);
    }
    Err(e) => println!("Error: {}", e),
}
```

--------------------------------

### Allow Hostname or Pattern with PolicyBuilder

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/url_jail/struct.PolicyBuilder.html

Adds a rule to allow a specific hostname or a pattern, overriding any existing blocklist rules. This method can be chained.

```rust
pub fn allow_host(self, pattern: &str) -> Self
```

--------------------------------

### Test Alibaba Cloud Metadata

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/blocklist.rs.html

Tests blocking of the Alibaba Cloud metadata endpoint. This snippet also demonstrates checking against `Policy::AllowPrivate`.

```rust
let alibaba: IpAddr = "100.100.100.200".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(is_ip_blocked(alibaba, Policy::PublicOnly).is_some());
        assert!(is_ip_blocked(alibaba, Policy::AllowPrivate).is_some());
```

--------------------------------

### Allow an IP range using CIDR notation

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/policy_builder.rs.html

Adds a CIDR allow rule to the policy, which can override base policy restrictions. Invalid CIDR strings are ignored.

```rust
pub fn allow_cidr(mut self, cidr: &str) -> Self {
        if let Ok(net) = cidr.parse() {
            self.allowed_cidrs.push(net);
        }
        self
    }
```

--------------------------------

### Parse Unicode hostname and normalization

Source: https://docs.rs/url_jail/latest/src/url_jail/safe_url.rs.html

Tests how `SafeUrl::parse` handles Unicode hostnames. The parser is expected to convert them to Punycode or handle them appropriately.

```rust
fn test_unicode_hostname_gets_normalized() {
    // Unicode hostnames should be converted to punycode by the URL parser
    let result = SafeUrl::parse("http://münchen.de/");
    // Should either work (with punycode) or fail cleanly
    match result {
        Ok(url) => {
            // Should be normalized to punycode
            let host = url.host();
            assert!(host == "münchen.de" || host.contains("xn-- MÜNCHEN.DE"));
        }
        Err(_) => {
            // Or fail cleanly if normalization is not supported
        }
    }
}
```
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