### Install FoxGuard via Script

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-8-0-pq-crypto-audit

Install FoxGuard using the provided shell script for quick setup.

```bash
curl -fsSL https://foxguard.dev/install.sh | sh
```

--------------------------------

### foxguard Output Example for PQ Findings

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-8-0-pq-crypto-audit

Example output from the `foxguard pqc .` command, showing a specific finding in `src/tls/client.go`. It details the severity, rule ID (CWE-327), vulnerability description, and the relevant CNSA 2.0 deadline.

```text
src/tls/client.go
  42:14  HIGH      go/pq-vulnerable-crypto (CWE-327)
         ECDH P-256 is not post-quantum safe. CNSA 2.0 mandates ML-KEM-1024
         for NSS; ML-KEM-768 is the NIST default for commercial use.
         CNSA 2.0 deadline: traditional networking equipment, 2030.

WARNING  1 PQ finding in 18 files (0.04s): 1 high, 0 medium, 0 low
CNSA 2.0 migration: at-risk (1 finding with an NSA transition deadline)
```

--------------------------------

### Install FoxGuard with Cargo

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-8-0-pq-crypto-audit

Install FoxGuard using the Rust package manager, Cargo.

```bash
cargo install foxguard
```

--------------------------------

### Initialize Foxguard Local Hook

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/how-to-roll-out-foxguard-without-blowing-up-ci

Install the local hook to add a pre-commit path for Foxguard. This provides a starter configuration without impacting CI.

```bash
foxguard init
```

--------------------------------

### Python Cross-File Taint Tracking Example

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/taint-tracking-without-the-yaml

This example demonstrates how FoxGuard traces taint across file boundaries. Taint from user input in `views.py` is tracked to a sink in `queries.py`.

```python
# views.py
from . import queries
def search(request):
    name = request.GET["name"]
    return queries.run_query(name)   # ← cross-file taint fires here

# queries.py
def run_query(name):
    cur.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'")
```

--------------------------------

### Flask False Positive: No Source

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/taint-tracking-without-the-yaml

In this Flask example, 'os.system' is called with a literal string, and there is no tainted input source within the function. Foxguard correctly reports no finding.

```python
@app.route("/healthz")
def healthz():
    os.system("uptime")               # literal, not tainted
    return "ok"
```

--------------------------------

### Python Cross-File Taint Analysis Example

Source: https://foxguard.dev/

Demonstrates how untrusted input flows across file boundaries in Python. This example shows a source in `views.py` and a sink in `queries.py`, highlighting Foxguard's ability to trace dataflow.

```python
from . import queries

def search(request):
    name = request.GET["name"]
    return queries.run_query(name)
```

```python
def run_query(name):
    cur = db.cursor()
    cur.execute(
        "SELECT * FROM users" 
        " WHERE name = '" + name + "'"
    )
```

--------------------------------

### Express: Hardcoded Session Secrets in Examples

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/scanning-top-frameworks

These examples demonstrate hardcoded session secrets in Express. Developers often copy-paste examples, potentially introducing vulnerabilities into production.

```javascript
secret: 'keyboard cat'
```

```javascript
app.use(cookieSession({ secret: 'manny is cool' }));
```

--------------------------------

### Python single-file taint example: Source

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cross-file-taint-in-003-seconds

Illustrates a source in a Python file where user input is obtained.

```python
# views.py
from . import queries

def search(request):
    name = request.GET["name"]
    return queries.run_query(name)
```

--------------------------------

### Foxguard Taint Analysis Example

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cross-file-taint-in-003-seconds

Demonstrates a critical SQL injection finding identified by foxguard, including the source, sink, and suggested fix. This output is generated in milliseconds.

```text
$ foxguard tests/fixtures/realistic/django_shop/ --explain

views.py
  52:12  CRITICAL  py/taint-sql-injection (CWE-89)
         django.request.GET reaches cursor.execute (via cross-file call to run_query)
    source → views.py:51   django.request.GET
    sink   → views.py:52   cursor.execute (via cross-file call to run_query)
  Fix: Use parameterized queries: cur.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?", (name,))
```

--------------------------------

### Launch foxguard TUI in Secrets Mode

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-7-0-tui-launch

Starts the foxguard TUI focused on scanning for secrets within the codebase.

```bash
npx foxguard tui --secrets .
```

--------------------------------

### Clone Linux Kernel and Run Dirty Frag Rule Pack

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/dirty-frag-rule-pack

Clone the Linux kernel repository and execute the foxguard scanner with the dirty-frag-class rules. Ensure you have the latest foxguard CLI installed.

```bash
git clone --depth=1 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
npx foxguard@latest --no-builtins \
  --rules rules/kernel/dirty-frag-class/ \
  linux/
```

--------------------------------

### Python single-file taint example: Sink

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cross-file-taint-in-003-seconds

Illustrates a sink in a Python file where tainted data could lead to a vulnerability.

```python
# queries.py
def run_query(name):
    cur.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'")
```

--------------------------------

### Run Foxguard Locally on Changed Files

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/how-to-roll-out-foxguard-without-blowing-up-ci

Use this command to get fast, relevant feedback scoped to the files a developer is currently modifying. This helps developers learn the tool's signal before any enforcement.

```bash
npx foxguard --changed .
```

--------------------------------

### Flask False Positive: Discarded Taint

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/taint-tracking-without-the-yaml

This Flask example shows user input being read but not used in a dangerous sink ('eval'). Foxguard correctly identifies no taint propagation and thus no finding.

```python
@app.route("/static-eval")
def static_eval():
    _ignored = request.args["expr"]   # read, but discarded
    return str(eval("1 + 1"))         # sink receives a literal
```

--------------------------------

### Try Foxguard

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/how-to-roll-out-foxguard-without-blowing-up-ci

A simple command to run Foxguard on the current directory, useful for initial testing or quick scans.

```bash
npx foxguard .
```

--------------------------------

### Explain Dataflow Traces with Foxguard

Source: https://foxguard.dev/

Generate detailed explanations of dataflow traces from source to sink, including file and line references, using the `--explain` flag. This aids in understanding the full path of tainted data.

```bash
--explain
```

--------------------------------

### Run FoxGuard 0.7.1

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-7-1-faster-taint

Execute FoxGuard version 0.7.1 using npx to scan the current directory. This command is a drop-in replacement for previous versions and offers faster performance.

```bash
npx foxguard@0.7.1 .
```

--------------------------------

### Load Semgrep Rules with Foxguard

Source: https://foxguard.dev/

Utilize existing Semgrep or OpenGrep rules within Foxguard by specifying them with the `--rules` flag. This allows for leveraging established rule sets.

```bash
--rules
```

--------------------------------

### Run PQ-vulnerable-crypto Rules with foxguard

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-8-0-pq-crypto-audit

Execute the PQ-vulnerable-crypto rules across a repository to identify cryptographic weaknesses and display migration deadlines. This command is useful for assessing compliance with NSA's CNSA 2.0 standards.

```bash
foxguard pqc .
```

--------------------------------

### Generate Foxguard Baseline

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/how-to-roll-out-foxguard-without-blowing-up-ci

Create a baseline file to capture existing issues in the repository. This separates historical noise from new findings.

```bash
foxguard baseline --output .foxguard/baseline.json .
```

--------------------------------

### Run Foxguard with Baseline

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/how-to-roll-out-foxguard-without-blowing-up-ci

Apply the generated baseline in normal scans. This shifts the focus to new issues introduced by a pull request.

```bash
foxguard --baseline .foxguard/baseline.json .
```

--------------------------------

### Run FoxGuard PQ Audit

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-8-0-pq-crypto-audit

Execute a post-quantum cryptography audit on the current directory using the latest FoxGuard version.

```bash
npx foxguard@latest pqc .
```

--------------------------------

### Refactoring Go Taint Analysis for Performance

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-7-1-faster-taint

Compares the 'before' and 'after' approaches to analyzing Go taint rules. The original method performed a separate AST walk for each rule, while the optimized version groups rules by sanitizer fingerprint for batched analysis, significantly reducing redundant work.

```rust
// Before: 9 walks per file (one per rule)
for rule in go_taint_rules {
    analyze_tree_with_cross_file(tree, &rule.spec);  // Pass 1 + Pass 2
}

// After: 2 walks per file (one per sanitizer group)
let groups = group_by_sanitizer_fingerprint(go_taint_rules);
for group in groups {
    analyze_tree_batched(tree, &group);  // shared Pass 1, batched sinks
}
```

--------------------------------

### Flask: Using exec() for Configuration Loading

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/scanning-top-frameworks

Flask's Config.from_pyfile() uses exec() to load Python configuration files, which is a security risk if an attacker can write to the config path, leading to code execution.

```python
exec(compile(config_file.read(), filename, "exec"), d.__dict__)
```

--------------------------------

### Go SQL Injection Taint Tracking

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/taint-tracking-without-the-yaml

Illustrates a Go HTTP handler where query parameter 'q' from 'r.URL.Query().Get' is used in a SQL query via 'db.Exec', resulting in SQL injection. Foxguard detects this as 'go/taint-sql-injection'.

```go
func search(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    q := r.URL.Query().Get("q")
    db.Exec("SELECT * FROM items WHERE name = '" + q + "'")
}
```

--------------------------------

### Try the latest foxguard TUI

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-7-0-tui-launch

This command ensures you are using the most recent version of the foxguard TUI for local scans, recommended for CI hooks and editor tasks.

```bash
npx foxguard@latest tui .
```

--------------------------------

### Initial CNSA 2.0 Deadline Logic

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cnsa2-deadlines-we-got-wrong

This Rust code snippet demonstrates the initial approach to determining CNSA 2.0 deadlines based on rule ID substrings. It was found to be problematic due to unsourced dates and a fragile heuristic.

```rust
// roughly what the first pass looked like
fn deadline_for(rule_id: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
    if rule_id.contains("signing") {
        Some("2030")
    } else if rule_id.contains("tls") || rule_id.contains("crypto") {
        Some("2033")
    } else {
        None
    }
}
```

--------------------------------

### Add Baseline-Backed CI Scan

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/how-to-roll-out-foxguard-without-blowing-up-ci

Integrate Foxguard into CI using the baseline. This ensures CI checks for new security issues introduced by changes.

```bash
npx foxguard@latest --baseline .foxguard/baseline.json .
```

--------------------------------

### Run FoxGuard Scan for Dirty Frag Rules

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/dirty-frag-rule-pack

Execute the FoxGuard scanner with specific rules targeting the Dirty Frag vulnerability class on a set of C test fixtures. This command demonstrates how to apply custom rules and analyze the output.

```bash
$ npx foxguard@latest --no-builtins \
    --rules rules/kernel/dirty-frag-class/ \
    tests/fixtures/kernel/dirty-frag/
foxguard v0.8.0 · scanning...
  .../aead_no_cow_vulnerable.c · 1 issue
    █  CRITICAL  In-place AEAD decrypt on skb without a dominating cow/unshare gate (Dirty Frag class). …
    █   semgrep/kernel/dirty-frag/skb-inplace-aead-no-cow (CWE-787)  line 27:1
    █   aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv);

  .../scatterwalk_store_vulnerable.c · 1 issue
  .../skcipher_no_cow_vulnerable.c · 1 issue

  3 issues  6 files · 0.01s

```

--------------------------------

### Gin: Default Engine Without Trusted Proxies

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/scanning-top-frameworks

The convenience package `ginS` in Gin creates a default engine without calling `SetTrustedProxies()`, potentially allowing IP spoofing via X-Forwarded-For.

```go
return gin.Default()
```

--------------------------------

### Launch foxguard TUI in Diff Mode

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-7-0-tui-launch

Initiates the foxguard TUI specifically for diff mode, allowing comparison of code changes.

```bash
npx foxguard tui --diff main .
```

--------------------------------

### Launch foxguard TUI

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-7-0-tui-launch

Use this command to launch the interactive terminal UI for foxguard. It opens to a launch picker with scan, diff, and secrets modes.

```bash
npx foxguard tui .
```

--------------------------------

### Flask Command Injection Taint Tracking

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/taint-tracking-without-the-yaml

Demonstrates a Flask route where user input from 'request.args' can lead to command injection via 'os.system'. Foxguard identifies this as 'py/taint-command-injection'.

```python
app.route("/ping")
def ping():
    host = request.args.get("host", "localhost")
    os.system("ping -c 1 " + host)
    return "ok"
```

--------------------------------

### Perform Branch Diffing with Foxguard

Source: https://foxguard.dev/

Show only the new findings introduced in the current branch compared to a specified base branch (e.g., `main`). This helps in focusing on recent changes and avoiding noise from existing code.

```bash
foxguard diff main
```

--------------------------------

### Define CNSA 2.0 Deadline Constants with Citations

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cnsa2-deadlines-we-got-wrong

Use `pub const` with doc comments to define deadline constants, including inline NSA citations and source references. This ensures clarity and traceability for each deadline.

```rust
/// Software & firmware signing — exclusive use of CNSA 2.0 by end of 2030.
///
/// Source: NSA CNSA 2.0 FAQ (Dec 2024, v2.1), transition-timeline table:
/// *"Software and firmware signing: Support and prefer by 2025;
/// exclusive use by 2030."* This is the earliest per-class deadline in
/// CNSA 2.0 because hash-based signatures (LMS/XMSS) and ML-DSA are
/// already standardized and fieldable.
pub const SOFTWARE_FIRMWARE_SIGNING: &str = "2030";

/// Web browsers / servers / cloud services — exclusive use by end of 2033.
///
/// Source: NSA CNSA 2.0 FAQ (Dec 2024, v2.1), transition-timeline table:
/// *"Cloud services and web browsers/servers: Support and prefer by
/// 2025; exclusive use by 2033."*
pub const WEB_AND_CLOUD: &str = "2033";
```

--------------------------------

### FoxGuard Rule for In-place AEAD Decrypt (Dirty Frag)

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/dirty-frag-rule-pack

This YAML configuration defines a FoxGuard rule to detect potential Dirty Frag vulnerabilities. It uses regex patterns to identify in-place AEAD decryption calls without proper copy-on-write or unsharing gates.

```yaml
rules:
  - id: kernel/dirty-frag/skb-inplace-aead-no-cow
    pattern-regex: '(?ms)^\s*aead_request_set_crypt\s*\([^}]*?crypto_aead_decrypt\s*\('
    pattern-not-regex: '(?s)\b(?:skb_cow_data|skb_copy|skb_unshare|skb_make_writable|pskb_expand_head)\s*\([^}]*?aead_request_set_crypt\s*\([^}]*?crypto_aead_decrypt\s*\('
    message: |
      In-place AEAD decrypt on skb without a dominating cow/unshare gate
      (Dirty Frag class). Verify skb_cow_data / skb_unshare / skb_make_writable /
      pskb_expand_head is reached on the unsafe path before
      aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, ...) + crypto_aead_decrypt(req).
      See oss-security 2026-05-07 advisory and pwnkit issue #263.
    severity: ERROR
    languages: [c]
    metadata:
      cwe: "CWE-787"

```

--------------------------------

### Generate CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM with foxguard

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/foxguard-0-8-0-pq-crypto-audit

Emit a CycloneDX 1.6 cryptographic bill of materials (CBOM) where each component is linked to its source file, line number, and severity. This command helps in inventorying cryptographic components and their associated risks.

```bash
foxguard --format cbom .
```

--------------------------------

### Post Findings as GitHub PR Review Comments

Source: https://foxguard.dev/

Directly post Foxguard findings as inline review comments on GitHub pull requests using the `--github-pr` flag. This integrates security feedback directly into the code review process.

```bash
--github-pr
```

--------------------------------

### Rails: Marshal.load for Cookie Deserialization

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/scanning-top-frameworks

Rails uses Marshal.load for cookie deserialization, which can lead to remote code execution if cookie data is tampered with. Rails mitigates this with signed/encrypted cookies, but the underlying primitive is inherently dangerous.

```ruby
Marshal.load
```

--------------------------------

### Flask: SHA-1 Fallback for Session Cookie Signing

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/scanning-top-frameworks

Flask uses SHA-1 in its session cookie signing fallback. SHA-1 is cryptographically broken and may be rejected by FIPS-compliant environments.

```python
return hashlib.sha1(string)
```

--------------------------------

### Annotate CNSA 2.0 Deadlines from Rule Registry

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cnsa2-deadlines-we-got-wrong

This function iterates through all rules in the registry, collects their CNSA 2.0 deadlines, and annotates findings with the corresponding deadline. It avoids string matching by directly using the rule ID to look up the deadline.

```rust
pub fn annotate_cnsa2_deadlines(findings: &mut [Finding], registry: &RuleRegistry) {
    let map: HashMap<&str, &'static str> = registry
        .all_rules()
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|r| r.cnsa2_deadline().map(|d| (r.id(), d)))
        .collect();

    for f in findings.iter_mut() {
        if let Some(deadline) = map.get(f.rule_id.as_str()) {
            f.cnsa2_deadline = Some((*deadline).to_string());
        }
    }
}
```

--------------------------------

### JavaScript SSRF Taint Tracking

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/taint-tracking-without-the-yaml

Shows an Express.js route where user-provided URL from 'req.query' can be used in 'fetch', leading to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). Foxguard flags this as 'js/taint-ssrf'.

```javascript
app.get("/fetch", (req, res) => {
    const url = req.query.url;
    fetch(url).then(r => r.text()).then(body => res.send(body));
});
```

--------------------------------

### Laravel: Variable Path Require in Maintenance Mode

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/scanning-top-frameworks

A finding in Laravel's maintenance mode entry point involves a `require` statement with a variable path. This is considered low risk as the base path is hardcoded.

```php
require $path;
```

--------------------------------

### Module Doc Comment Prohibiting Substring Matching

Source: https://foxguard.dev/blog/cnsa2-deadlines-we-got-wrong

Include a module-level doc comment that explicitly forbids substring matching on rule IDs to prevent accidental misinterpretation or loss of annotations.

```rust
//! ## Design notes (addresses PR #231 review)
//!
//! - **No substring matching on rule IDs.** The deadline is a property of the
//!   rule itself (declared in `impl_rule!`), so this module simply consults
//!   the registry. Renaming or adding a rule cannot silently drop its
//!   annotation.
//! - **No hardcoded dates without citations.** Every year used below is tied
//!   to a specific NSA document URL and quoted language.
```

=== COMPLETE CONTENT === This response contains all available snippets from this library. No additional content exists. Do not make further requests.